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DEFYING ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE:
PRISONERS AND THE "USUAL RESIDENCE" PRINCIPLE
ROSANNA M. TAORMINAt
INTRODUCTION
Criminal disenfranchisement laws in forty-eight states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia deny the right to vote to all convicted adults in
prison.' Thirty-two states also disenfranchise felons on parole; thirty
disenfranchise those on probation; and thirteen bar ex-offenders who
have fully served their sentences from voting for the remainder of
23their lives. In the 1974 case of Richardson v. Ramirez,3 the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of such laws. In that case, the
Court held that the constitutional right to Equal Protection of the
Laws4 does not require a state to permit felons to vote.' The Court
reasoned that exclusion of felons from the franchise was a historically
accepted practice and may be lawful when applied equally to all fel-
ons.6 Despite the Supreme Court's definitive holding, critics of felon
disenfranchisement laws have not been silenced. Several decades
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I See Appendix. For an in-depth discussion of the development and effects of
felon disenfranchisement laws, see generally JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, LOSING
THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAwS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1998); Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voter, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50 (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1939-63 (2002).
2 See Appendix.
3 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
5 418 U.S. at 54-56.
G Id. at 52-56.
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after the Ramirez decision, the constitutional difficulties inherent in
such laws continue to be examined with zeal .
The issue this Comment addresses is not the constitutionality of
felon disenfranchisement laws, but how those laws affect the constitu-
tionality of redistricting procedures in state and federal legislative dis-
tricts. In 1963, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Gray v.
Sanders," declared, "[t]he conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing-one person, one vote."9 While Gray dealt with the weight
of a person's vote within a previously designated geographical unit,0
the one-person, one-vote doctrine spilled over into the Court's juris-
prudence in examining constitutional challenges to the drawing of
congressional and legislative districts. One year after Gray, the Court
established that the Constitution imposes a fundamental requirement
on those charged with congressional and legislative redistricting-
population equality." "In practical terms, population equality means
that each district in an apportionment plan should have roughly, if
7 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Wyoming, No. 01-8078, 2002 WL 31243550, at *2-3 (10th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2002) (dismissing convicted felon's claim that his disenfranchisement vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause); Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984,
at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (denying convicted felon's assertion that his disenfran-
chisement violates various provisions of the federal Constitution, including the Equal
Protection Clause);Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1337-38 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(holding that Florida's felon disenfranchisement law does not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); NAACP v. Ridge, No. CIV. A. 00-2855, 2000 WL 1146619, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 14, 2000) (denying plaintiffs' request for an injunction against Pennsylvania's
felon disenfranchisement law); see also Martine J. Price, Note, Addressing Ex-Felon Disen-
franchisement: Legislation v. Litigation, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 369, 376-84 (2002) (recounting
various challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection
Clause).
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
9 Id. at 381.
10 The Gray court held:
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is des-
ignated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote-what-
ever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their
income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is
required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 379.
1 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (establishing that "the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practica-
ble"); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (holding that congressional districts
must be redrawn so that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is... worth as much as another's"); see also J. GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE
REALISTS' GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING THE LEGAL PITFALLS 1-11 (2000)
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each district in an apportionment plan should have roughly, if not
precisely, the same number of people as every other district.', 2 As will
be discussed in Part II, the Court has been strict in enforcing this re-
quirement.
The problem this Comment addresses arises when we examine
how states conduct redistricting. In most states, redistricting is based
on data from the decennial census.1 3 For purposes of the census, fel-
ons are counted where they are imprisoned, not, for example, where• 14
they were arrested or where they once resided. Thus, in states that
disenfranchise their prison population, the result of current district-
ing practices will be districts with equal population in theory only. In
reality, however, the percentage of eligible voters will vary significantly
will vary significantly across district lines. Assuming perfect voter
turnout, the victorious candidate in a prison system district will have
been elected by fewer people than the candidate in a district with no
prison. Even considering the fact that voter turnout will vary across
districts, an elected official in a no-prison district will effectively be re-
sponsible for, and accountable to, more constituents than the official
whose district contains a large, disenfranchised prison population.
(discussing the history of the Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence); NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, at 1-2 (1999) [here-
inafter REDISTRICTING LAW 2000] (noting a shift in population demographics after
World War I and describing the major Supreme Court redistricting cases of the 1960s);
RICHARD K. SCHER ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE LAW AND POLITICS
OF DISTRICTING 19-29 (1997) (discussing the history of gerrymandering and malappor-
tionment, and the particular problems faced by the Supreme Court and the states in
the 1960s due to disproportionate population growth); Peyton McCrary, Bringing
Equality to Power: How the Federal Courts Transformed the Electoral Structure of Southern Poli-
tics, 1960-1990, 5 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 665, 667, 675-81 (2003) (describing the Supreme
Court's "reapportionment revolution").
12 HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 1.
13 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (holding that states must redis-
trict "using the best census data available"); see also HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 2
("States engaged in congressional or state-legislative redistricting have ordinarily used
the copulation figures generated by the federal decennial census.").
See District of Columbia v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 789 F. Supp. 1179,
1180 (D.D.C. 1992) ("[T]he Census Bureau has developed a set of special enumera-
tion and residence rules for.., persons living in group quarters, including prisons.
Residents of group quarters are enumerated as residents of the locality where the quar-
ters are located .. "); U.S. Census Bureau, Facts About Census 2000 Residence Rules, at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/resid-rules.html (last modified
Apr. 25, 2003) (stating that prisoners are counted at the institution where they are im-
prisoned); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2000, FORM D-61A,
available at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d6l a.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2003)
(instructing census respondents not to include members of their household institu-
tionalized in a correctional facility).
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The result is the unequal weighting of votes across district lines-a
practice that does not stand on firm constitutional ground.
Counting prisoners for redistricting purposes in the districts in
which they are imprisoned is legally problematic on both constitu-
tional and statutory levels. As previously mentioned, such a practice
cannot be squared with the constitutional requirement of one-person,
one-vote. Additionally, this practice effectively runs afoul of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,15 which prohibits redistricting plans
that have a dilutive effect on the voting strength of racial minorities.1
6
The practice in question may violate the Act because it often has the
effect of diluting racial blocs or making it appear as though a bloc ex-
ists when in fact one does not. Though Voting Rights Act litigation is
complex, a discussion of the possible clash between the Act and the
practice of counting felons where they are imprisoned for redistrict-
ing purposes is warranted.
Additional questions arise beyond the legal framework developed
in this Comment. If it is unconstitutional to count prisoners where
they are imprisoned for redistricting purposes, then where should
they be counted? The counting of members of the military, college
students, children, and noncitizens raises similar problems. How
should we deal with these populations? What legislative alternatives
are there for counting prisoners? And what is the ultimate policy so-
lution for these issues? Finally, if state legislatures, which are ulti-
mately responsible for redistricting, do not act to correct the
identified constitutional and statutory infirmities, what is the proper
way to litigate this issue? Who has standing? What relief should be
sought? Many of these questions lie outside the scope of this Com-
ment and will not be answered here. It is important, however, to ac-
knowledge their existence so that others may pick up where this
Comment leaves off.
Part I of this analysis discusses the history of the Supreme Court's
one-person, one-vote jurisprudence. Part II addresses the Court's no-
tion of perfect population equality and its standards for evaluating
federal congressional and state legislative redistricting plans. In Part
15 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973
to 1973bb-I (2000)).
16 See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 78-79 (1986) (holding that redis-
tricting plans which "ha[ve] the effect of diluting the minority vote" violate Section 2's
prohibition on electoral changes that have a "discriminatory effect"); see also infra Part
VI.B (discussing the standard for establishing discriminatory effect under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act).
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III, the analysis shifts to a discussion of the decennial Census and the
usual residence principle as they apply to the counting of the United
States prison population. Part IV examines the constitutional clash
between the Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence and the Cen-
sus' usual residence principle. Part V briefly addresses other popula-
tions to which the usual residence principle applies-college students,
members of the military, children, and noncitizens-and distinguishes
them from the prison population. Part VI is an analysis of the colli-
sion between the usual residence principle as applied to prisoners and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Finally, Part VII offers possible solu-
tions to the constitutional and statutory problems presented by the
usual residence principle.
I. THE HISTORY OF ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE
Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution reads in part:
"[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members cho-
sen every second Year by the People of the several States .... [and]
Representatives... shall be apportioned among the several States...
according to their respective numbers . .."", The Supreme Court has
relied on this section of the Constitution to fonnulate its one-person,
one-vote population equality requirement for congressional districts. 8
Because Article I, Section 2 only speaks to how representatives in our
federal system are to be apportioned, the Court has relied on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"' to extend
the one-person, one-vote requirement to state legislative distri ts.
2 0
Although the Court's standards for population deviation are more le-
nient for state legislative districts than congressional districts,' the
Court is nonetheless strict in its review of state districting practices.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
18 See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 3 ("The Supreme Court has interpreted
[Article I, Section 2] to mean that only a very small amount of [population] deviation
is acceptable within a State's congressional redistricting plan.").
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20 See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (affirming decision invalidat-
ing Alabama's legislative apportionment on equal protection grounds); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) (remanding for consideration of an equal protection claim to
Tennessee's legislative districts).
2' A total population deviation of less than ten percent among state legislative dis-
tricts generally requires no justification from state officials, but courts may require a
justification for a deviation as small as ten people when analyzing federal congressional
districts. Compare Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161 (1993) (holding that, "as a
general matter .... [a legislative] apportionment plan with a maximum population
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The Court did not always adhere to a strict review of state district-
ing practices. In fact, when the Court was first asked to review the dis-
tricting practices of state officials, it declined. In 1946, the Supreme
Court was presented with Colegrove v. Green.2 In that case, members of
the Illinois electorate challenged provisions of Illinois law governing
federal congressional districts claiming, inter alia, that the laws vio-
23lated the United States Constitution . The voters alleged "that by rea-
son of subsequent changes in population the congressional districts
for the election of Representatives in the Congress created by the [Il-
linois laws] lacked.., approximate equality of population."24 Con-
gressional district populations "ranged from a low of 112,000 to a high
of 900,000.,, 2 5 As a result, the vote of a person in the state's largest
congressional district was worth one-eighth as much as the vote of a
person in the state's smallest district.211 Writing for a divided Court,
Justice Frankfurter concluded that the voters' claim was not justici-
able. "The basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suf-
fered by Illinois as a polity."2 7 Accordingly, Frankfurter concluded
that "[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy
for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will ap-
portion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress."
28
Sixteen years later, however, the Court chose to enter the political
thicket of redistricting and has since developed a comprehensive ju-
risprudence based on the same principle of population equality ar-
gued by the Illinois voters in Colegrove. In the 1962 case of Baker v.
Carr,n plaintiffs challenged the apportionment of members of Ten-
deviation under 10%" is a "minor deviation[] ... insufficient to make out a prima facie
case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require
justification by the State" (quoting Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983))),
and Brown, 462 U.S. at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T] his Court has recognized
that a state legislative apportionment scheme with a maximum population deviation
exceeding 10% creates a prima facie case of discrimination."), with Anne Arundel
County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Advisory Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp.
394, 396 (D. Md. 1991) (requiring justification for a ten-person deviation in Mary-
land's congressional districts), summarily affd, 504 U.S. 938 (1992).
2 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
23 Id. at 550-51.
24 Id.
25 SCHER ET AL., supra note 11, at 22.
26 Id.
27 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
28 Id. at 556; see also SCHER ET AL., supra note 11, at 23 (describing the Colegrove de-
cision as a "catch-22" because it required voters to seek relief for their partial disen-
franchisement through the political process).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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nessee's General Assembly, claiming that Tennessee law "denied
[plaintiffs] the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by
virtue of the debasement of their votes. ''  The disparity of population
deviations in Tennessee's legislative districts was even more severe
than those in the Colegrove case, as "the largest district ... had more
than 44 times the population of the smallest district., 31 Without ruling
on the merits of the case, the Court declared that "the mere fact that
the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents
a political question. 3 ' The Court concluded that "the complaint's al-
legations of a denial of equal protection present ajusticiable constitu-
tional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and
a decision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment.,
33
In 1963 and 1964, the Court decided three landmark redistricting
cases that are now credited with the development of the phrase and
principle, "one person, one vote." In Gray v. Sanders,3' plaintiffs chal-
lenged Georgia's county unit system of voting as a violation of the
35Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments. The county unit sys-
tem, 6 used as the basis for counting votes in the Democratic primary
for statewide officials, allocated only 1.46% of the total unit votes to a
county that comprised 14.11% of Georgia's total population.37 Mean-
while, Georgia's smallest county, with only 0.05% of the State's popu-
38lation, was accorded 0.48% of the unit vote. In other words, one unit
vote in the largest county represented 92,721 residents, while one unit
vote in the smallest county represented only 938 residents.39 One
resident in the smallest county had the same influence on a candi-
0 Id. at 187-88.
3' McCrary, supra note 11, at 676.
'2 Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
33 Id. at 237.
34 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
35 Id. at 370.
36 The Georgia Constitution allocated a certain number of state representatives
(three, two, or one) to each county. Candidates who received the majority of the
popular vote in each county carried the county and received two "unit votes" for each
state representative in that county. State and federal elections were decided by these
"unit votes." Id. at 370-71.
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date's nomination as ninety-nine residents in the largest county. ° The
Court held that this amounted to unequal representation for equal
numbers of people.4 1 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, declared:
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is
designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal
vote-whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation,
whatever their income, wherever their home may be in that geographical
unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.42
Thus, Georgia's county unit system could not be employed so long as
it perpetuated inequality of voting power.4 Justice Douglas concluded
with a sentence that would be quoted for years to come: "The concep-
tion of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote."44
Justice Douglas's analysis in Gray opened the door for the Court's
decisions in two 1964 cases involving state apportionment practices
more common than the county unit system.4 The state practices chal-
lenged in Wesbery v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sim v4 7 involved the appor-
tionment of federal congressional and state legislative districts,
respectively. In Wesbeny, voters from the Fifth Congressional District
of Georgia challenged the population composition of their district be-
cause it was substantially larger than the nine other congressional dis-
tricts in Georgia. According to the 1960 Census, Georgia's Fifth
Congressional District contained 823,680 people, while the average
population of Georgia's ten districts was 394,312.48 "[S]ince there
[was] only one Congressman for each district, this inequality of popu-
lation mean[t] that the Fifth District's Congressman [had] to repre-
sent from two to three times as many people as [did] Congressmen
40 Id.
" See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (stating that the Constitution
has a "plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people").
" Gray, 372 U.S. at 379.
43 See id. at 381 ("[Olnce the class of voters is chosen and their qualifications speci-
fied, we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be evaded.").
44 Id.
45 See SCHER ET AL., supra note 11, at 25-26 (discussing Gray, Wesberny, and Reynolds).
46 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
47 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
48 Wesberny, 376 U.S. at 2.
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from some of the other Georgia districts.""' Relying on the command
of Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution-that Repre-
sentatives be chosen "by the People of the several States"50-the Court
in Wesbeny held that "as nearly as is practicable[,] one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's.' The
Court reasoned that:
It would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compro-
mise-equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people-
for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of
congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice
in choosing a Congressman than others.2
The second key redistricting case decided in 1964 was Reynolds v.
Sims.Y This case involved a series of challenges to the apportionment
of Alabama's legislature. 54 In contrast to Wesbeny, which involved a
challenge to the state practice of apportioning federal congressional
districts, the Court in Reynolds relied on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to ultimately extend its one-person,
one-vote tenet to the apportionment or redistricting of both houses of
a state's legislature .5 The Court held that:
As a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be ap-
portioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual's right to
vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is
in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens liv-
ing in other parts of the State .
49 Id.
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
51 Wesbery, 376 U.S. at 7-8. The Court did not reach claims that the Georgia stat-
ute violated the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 8 n.10.
52 Id. at 14.
53 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
54 On the same day as the Reynolds decision, the Court also decided challenges to
five other states in apportioning their state legislatures. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695
(1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); Md. Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomezo, 377
U.S. 633 (1964) (New York).
55 377 U.S. at 571, 574-76 (rejecting defendants' argument that the Georgia Sen-
ate was analogous to the United States Senate and thus did not require equally appor-
tioned districts).
56 Id. at 568.
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The overall effect of the Court's activity in 1963 and 1964 "was to
alter forever the representation in state legislatures and to create far
more equity in congressional districts than had existed before."
57
II. MEASURING POPULATION EQUALITY
How close must a state get to perfect population equality in order
to satisfy the Court's mandate of one-person, one-vote? It is important
to note that most courts measure population equality using "overall
population deviation" or "total population deviation"-namely, "the
difference between the populations of the most heavily, and least
heavily, populated districts."5s This figure can be expressed as a per-
centage of the ideal population of a district. For a single-member
legislative plan, the ideal population is equal to the total population of
a state divided by the number of allotted congressional or state legisla-
tive seats.6°
Perhaps because "[tIhe equal population requirements do not
rest on the same stone in the constitutional foundation of the Repub-
lic," 6t the Court has developed two different legal standards for evalu-
57 SCHER ET AL., supra note 11, at 26. However, as one scholar has noted, Con-
gress's "[o]pposition to the one person, one vote standard" for state legislatures "was
initially substantial." McCrary, supra note 11, at 680. In 1964, a coalition of Republi-
cans and Democrats in the United States Senate introduced a constitutional amend-
ment that would have permitted at least one house of a state legislature to be
apportioned on a basis other than equal population. See id. (discussing a constitutional
amendment introduced by Sen. Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.), the minority leader, and Sen.
Frank Church (D-Idaho) that would have permitted a deviation from equipopulous
districts). This amendment garnered the support of a majority of the Senate, but fell
seven votes short of the required two-thirds supermajority. Id. The same year, a pro-
posal by Rep. William Tuck (D-Va.) to "strip the federal courts of all power over state
legislative apportionment" was approved by the House, but failed in the Senate. Id.
HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 1; see also REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, supra note
11, at 22 (referring to "overall population deviation" or "total population deviation" as
"overall range" and calling it "[p] erhaps the most commonly used measure" of deter-
mining compliance with the one-person, one-vote standard).
59 See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at I (explaining that a state with 1000 people
and five districts would have perfect population equality-zero percent population de-
viation-if each of the five districts contained 200 people).
60 See REDISTRICTING LAw 2000, supra note 11, at 21 (noting that courts have not
always used redistricting measures consistently or precisely, which has led to confu-
sion).
61 Id. at 23 (referring to Court's reliance on Article I, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution to justify its population equality requirement for federal congres-
sional districts, while relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to justify the requirement for state legislative districts).
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ating federal congressional and state legislative redistricting plans
-strict equality and the ten percent rule, respectively
2
A. Federal Congressional Districts
In general, the Court demands strict equality when examining the
population make-up of a state's federal congressional districts.'! Nar-
rowly considered, strict equality means zero total population devia-
tion. Thus, a sure way to avoid a constitutional one-person, one-vote
challenge would be to draw districts with the minimum possible popu-
64lation deviation. But as will be discussed, the Court has carved out a
few narrow exceptions to its strict equality standard that allow for
"only a very small amount of deviation" from strict equality.65 As will
be seen, these exceptions do not bear on the constitutional analysis of
counting prisoners where they are imprisoned for redistricting pur-
poses.
Although the Court in Wesberry held that "as nearly as is practica-
ble[,] one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as
,66much as another's," it took several cases in the following decades to
hammer out the details of the Court's population equality jurispru-
dence for congressional districts. In 1969, the Court made its first at-
tempt to "elucidate the 'as nearly as practicable' standard., 6' The case
of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler involved a challenge to the composition of Mis-
souri's ten congressional districts. 68 A 1967 Missouri General Assembly
redistricting statute created congressional districts with a total popula-
62 See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 1-11 (discussing the two distinct legal stan-
dards for determining whether the principle of population equality has been satisfied).
63 See REDISTRICTING LAw 2000, supra note 11, at 23-28 (surveying the Court's con-
sistent affirmation of the status quo regarding one-person, one-vote standards in con-
gressional redistricting); see also infra text accompanying notes 76-86 (describing the
Court's requirements for congressional redistricting since Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725 (1983)). But cf. HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 5-6 ("As with so many redistricting
issues, it is hazardous to speculate precisely which deviations will be acceptable to the
courts and which will be struck down.").
HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 3-4 (noting that, in the 1990s, "most [s]tates
drew plans in which the total deviation was less than 100 people" and that "[n]ine
[s] tates drew plans in which the population of the largest district exceeded that of the
smallest district by just one person").
(5 Id. at 3.
66 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528 (1969).
68 Id. at 528-29.
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tion deviation of 5.97%. 69 The Court rejected Missouri's argument
"that there is a fixed numerical or percentage population variance
small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy without ques-
tion the 'as nearly as practicable' standard."70 The Court concluded
that "the 'as nearly as practicable' standard requires that the State
make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality.
Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown
to have resulted despite such effort, the State must justify each vari-
ance, no matter how small.'
In 1973, the Court invalidated a Texas redistricting law that re-
sulted in 4.13% total population deviation72-an overall deviation
even less than in Kirkpatrick. The plaintiffs presented alternative plans
to the Court, enabling it to select a plan that better effectuated the
one-person, one-vote principle . 7  Relying on the holding in Kirkpa-
trick-permitting only population variances that "are unavoidable de-
spite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which
justification is shown"74 -the Court concluded that the existence of
the alternative plans proved that the percentage deviations between
districts "were not 'unavoidable,' and the districts were not as mathe-
matically equal as reasonably possible. 7 5
The leading case dealing with strict population equality of con-
gressional districts is Karcher v. Daggett,76 decided in 1983. In that case,
69 See id. (summarizing the percentage variation from the ideal population for
each of Missouri's ten congressional districts). The ideal population for each district
was 431,981. The population of the largest district was 13,542 (3.13%) above the ideal,
while the population of the smallest district was 12,260 (2.84%) below the ideal, based
on 1960 Census data. Id.
70 Id. at 530.
71 Id. at 530-31 (internal citation omitted). The Court rejected several justifica-
tions offered by the Missouri General Assembly. Id. at 533-34. Some of the rejected
justifications-respecting political subdivisions, distinct economic and social communi-
ties of interest, and practical politics-were later accepted as legitimate redistrict crite-
ria by the Court in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983), and in Abrams v.
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 99-100 (1997). See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 3-5 (explain-
ing the Karcher court's two-step analysis, where step one considers the size of the devia-
tion, and step two considers the justification for the deviation).
72 White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 785 (1973).
73 Id. at 789 n.6 (highlighting alternate redistricting plans proposed at the trial
court level).
74 Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531.
75 White, 412 U.S. at 790. The Court again passed on the state's justifications of
avoiding fragmentation of political subdivisions and respect for "constituency-
representative relations." Id. at 791. See also supra note 71 (surveying other justifica-
tions for population deviation, many of which were later accepted as legitimate).
76 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
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the plaintiffs challenged New Jersey's congressional redistricting plan
that resulted in a total population deviation of less than 0.7% of an
average district, with a difference between the largest and smallest dis-
tricts of 3674 people." The Court, with Justice Brennan writing for
the majority, struck down the plan as unconstitutional and reaffirmed
its position in Kirkpatrick, stating "that there are no de minimis popula-
tion variations, which could practicably be avoided, but which none-
theless meet the standard of Art. I, § 2, without justification." 78 The
plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that a different redistricting plan
existed with a maximum population deviation of 0.45% of the average
district, 7" indicating that the state's adopted plan "was not the product
of a good-faith effort to achieve population equality.,
80
Proving a deviation from equal population, however, was not the
end of the inquiry. The Court then shifted the burden to the State of
New Jersey "to prove that the population deviations in its plan were
necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective., 8' The examples
of legitimate state objectives offered by the Court were: "making dis-
tricts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores
of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Represen-
tatives," as long as such legislative policies were "consistently applied"
in a "nondiscriminatory" manner and the population deviations were
"minor."8 2 The Court further elaborated on the state's burden, stating
that:
The State must, however, show with some specificity that a particular ob-
jective required the specific deviations in its plan, rather than simply re-
lying on general assertions. The showing required to justify population
deviations is flexible, depending on the size of the deviations, the impor-
tance of the State's interests, the consistency with which the plan as a
whole reflects those interests, and the availability of alternatives that
might substantially vindicate those interests yet approximate population
equality more closely.83
77 Id. at 728.
78 Id. at 734.
19 Id. at 728-729.
80 Id. at 740.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 741; see also HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 3-5 (examining the Court's
analysis in Karcher).
444 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 1A WREVIEW
Lower federal courts have taken the Supreme Court's one-person,
one-vote mandate to heart.84 The Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland even required the state to justify a total population
deviation of only ten people between the largest and smallest dis-
tricts.8" Using the criteria laid out in Karcher, the court accepted the
state's justifications that the plan kept three major regions intact, cre-
ated a minority voting district, and respected incumbent representa-
tion.8 6 It is important to note that none of the "legitimate state
objectives" recognized by Karcher or its progeny come close to justify-
ing the counting of prisoners for redistricting purposes in the districts
where they are imprisoned.
B. State Legislative Districts
Because zero percent population variance is the clearest standard
by which to measure one-person, one-vote violations, it is the standard
this Comment adopts for its analysis. It is worth noting, however, that
the Court has developed a more lenient benchmark for determining
whether state legislative districting plans satisfy one-person, one-vote.
The Court has enforced a ten percent standard, meaning that a total
population deviation of up to ten percent for state legislative districts
87is generally acceptable without justification . As previously men-
tioned, the Court has relied on the Equal Protection Clause to extend
its Article I, Section 2 one-person, one-vote requirement in federal
congressional districting plans to districting plans for state legisla-
tures.88 It has determined, however, that the Equal Protection Clause
does not require "perfect population equality" for state legislative
84 For a list of lower court decisions relying on Karcher to determine if congres-
sional district plans achieve population equality, see REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, supra
note 11, at 26 n.72. For an analysis of several lower court, post-Karcher decisions in
Texas, Arkansas, California, and Georgia, see HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 5-8.
85 Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Advisory Bd. of Elec-
tion Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 396 (D. Md. 1991), summarily aff'd, 504 U.S. 938 (1992); see
also Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d. 672, 676 (M.D. Pa.) (per curiam) (holding
that a nineteen-person deviation between the largest and smallest congressional dis-
tricts in Pennsylvania violated Karches interpretation of the constitutional one-person,
one-vote principle), appeal dismissed as moot, 537 U.S. 801 (2002).
86 Id. at 397.
87 See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 9-11 (explaining the "ten percent rule" and
examples of how the Court has applied it); REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, supra note 11, at
30-43 (discussing the origins of the "ten percent standard" in 1973 and its application
to later Supreme Court cases that challenge state legislative districting plans).
88 See supra Part II.A.
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districts,89 so long as the districting plan is "based on legitimate con-
siderations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy."'
While the ten percent rule is not unchallengeable, 9 the Court has
stated that a maximum population deviation of under ten percent is
not, by itself, sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment so as to require state justification.92
III. THE CENSUS AND THE USUAL RESIDENCE PRINCIPLE
In all of the cases discussed thus far, the Court has relied on data
from the decennial United States Census to calculate ideal popula-
tion, total population deviation, and other figures implicated in chal-
lenged statewide redistricting plans. A brief history of the census and
its role in reapportionment and redistricting is essential to a compre-
hensive analysis of the problems presented by the way the census has
traditionally counted prisoners.9
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution
makes it clear that one of the main purposes, if not the main purpose,
of the decennial census is to apportion Representatives "among the
several States ... according to their respective Numbers. ' 4  The
89 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743 (1973).
90 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 579 (1964)).
91 See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 9 ("[E]ven a deviation below 10% might be
challenged if it was a product of some unconstitutional, irrational, or arbitrary state
policy, such as intentionally discriminating against certain groups of voters, certain cit-
ies, or certain regions of the State.").
92 The Court has noted:
[W]e have held that "minor deviations from mathematical equality among
state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of in-
vidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require jus-
tification by the State." Our decisions have established, as a general matter,
that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under
10% falls within this category of minor deviations.
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
93 For a comprehensive history of the decennial census and its role in reappor-
tionment and redistricting, see REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, supra note 11, at 6-19. See
also Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 491-506 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (discussing the history of the Census to discern the "original meaning" of
the Census Clause).
04 Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 reads in relevant part:
Representatives... shall be apportioned among the several States... accord-
ing to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons... [and] three fifths of all other Persons. The
actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of
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"respective Numbers" of the states are determined by an "actual Enu-
meration" made every ten years°95-hence, the creation of the decen-
nial census. The Constitution gives Congress the power to effectuate
its demand of an "actual Enumeration, "'9 and, through Title 13 of the
United States Code, Congress delegated the responsibility for con-
ducting a census to the Department of Commerce," which in turn
created the Census Bureau.98 Once the census is conducted, the Sec-
retary of Commerce must report the census results to the President of
the United States by December 31 of the census year.99 The President
then uses this information to apportion Representatives in Congress
among the several States. The Secretary of Commerce must also re-
port her findings to the individual states no later than one year after
the decennial census date.'00 Most states (and courts) use the infor-
mation generated by the decennial census to create and review their
federal congressional and state legislative redistricting plans.'0 '
Thus far, it is unclear why using the information gathered
through the decennial census for redistricting purposes would be le-
gally problematic. There are, however, several problems with using
these raw data specifically for redistricting purposes. These problems
arise as a result of the Census Bureau's development of the "usual
residence" principle. According to the Census Bureau, usual resi-
dence-the main principle in determining where a person is to be
counted for the purpose of the census-"has been defined as the
place where the person lives and sleeps most of the time. This place is
not necessarily the same as the person's voting residence or legal resi-
the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten
Years, in such a Manner as they shall by Law direct.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 was subsequently amended by
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided in part: "Representatives
shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
2.
95 U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
96 Id.
97 13 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
98 REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, supra note 11, at 7.
99 13 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2000).
100 Id. § 141 (c). The decennial census date is April 1 of the year in which the cen-
sus is administered (e.g., 1980, 1990, 2000). Id. § 141 (a).
101 HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 2; REDISTRICTING LAw 2000, supra note 11, at
7. Redistricting is the process of redrawing boundaries of election districts, while re-
apportionment is the process of reallocating congressional seats among the states or
legislative seats within the states. REDISTRICTING LAw 2000, supra note 11, at 7 n.26.
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dence." 10 2 This principle affects, among others, the counting of col-
lege students, members of the military, and those undergoing drug
treatment programs.0) Most importantly, the usual residence princi-
ple affects the way in which prisoners are counted; it requires census
officials to count imprisoned adults andjuveniles at the place in which
they are institutionalized."'
As mentioned in the Introduction, forty-eight states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia deny the right to vote to all convicted adults in
prison. 0 5 Thirty-two states also disenfranchise felons on parole; thirty
disenfranchise those on probation; and thirteen bar ex-offenders who
have fully served their sentences from voting for life. 0 6 The Court has
determined that, standing alone, such laws are constitutional. 7 The
Court, however, has never addressed the constitutional implications
that these laws, in combination with the Census Bureau's usual resi-
dence principle, may have in the context of state redistricting prac-
tices.
IV. ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
At year end 2002, the Department of Justice estimated that 6.7
million people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on parole-one
102 U.S. Census Bureau, Facts About Census 2000 Residence Rules, at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/resid-rules.html (last modified
Apr. 25, 2003).
1 Id. One-person, one-vote problems also arise because the census counts chil-
dren under eighteen and noncitizens in the figures transferred to states for redistrict-
ing purposes. However, neither children under eighteen nor noncitizens have the
legal fight to vote. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (2000) (acknowledging the right of
United States citizens to vote); Id. § 1973bb (enforcing, under the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, the right to vote of all citizens who are at least eighteen years of age); see
also U.S. CONST. amend XXVI, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older to vote shall not be denied or abridged ...."). While
not the main focus of this Comment, these problems will be addressed briefly in Part
IV, infra. Counting each of these populations in figures used for redistricting purposes
raises serious constitutional difficulties, and a separate article could be written about
each group.
U.S. Census Bureau, Facts About Census 2000 Residence Rules, at http://
www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/residrules.html (last modified Apr. 25,
2003).
105 See supra note I and accompanying text.
10 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
107 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding California's disen-
franchisement of ex-felons); cf supra note 7 (discussing recent challenges to the consti-
tutionality of felon disenfranchisement laws).
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in every thirty-two adults.' s The Census Bureau also determined that
approximately two million people resided in correctional institutions
at the time of the 2000 Census.'0 9 Although these individuals cannot
vote in most states, they are nonetheless included in the population
figures used to calculate the size and location of congressional dis-
tricts throughout the state. The number of prisoners, in effect, in-
flates the population of the congressional district in which they are
counted. As a result, an individual's vote in a rural congressional dis-
trict that contains a densely populated correctional institution is
weighted more heavily than an individual's vote in a prisonless dis-
trict."0 The inflation of one citizen's voting power at the expense of
another's is precisely what the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote
jurisprudence forbids. The Court has stated expressly that "there are
no de minimis population variations, which could practicably be
avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard of Article I, Section
2, without justification.""' The justifications accepted by the Court-
"making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserv-
ing the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incum-
bent Representatives"" 2-are simply not applicable here. The
suggestion is not that prisoners, no matter where they are located
throughout a state, should be combined to form one discrete congres-
sional district. Rather, as discussed in Part VII, there are several "prac-
ticable" solutions to the identified constitutional dilemma that would
enable state officials to maintain respect for political subdivisions,
compact districts, and other consistently accepted policies. State offi-
108 LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2002, at 1 (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus02.pdf
(last modified Aug. 18, 2003).
109 See KIMBALL JONAS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GROUP QUARTERS ENUMERATION 55
app. C (2003) (stating that 1,976,018 persons were imprisoned nationwide at the time
of the 2000 Census), available at http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/E.5%
20R.pdf; see also PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 2002, at 1 (2003) ("Overall, the United States incarcerated 2,166,260
persons at yearend 2002."), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pO2.pdf.
110 See generally Peter Wagner, Prison Initiative, Importing Constituents: Prisoners
and Political Clout in New York 9 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("Every urban prisoner counted as a rural resident decreases the number of 'real' rural
residents required for a rural district. As the number of real residents declines, the
weight of a vote from a rural resident increases."), available at http://www.prison
policy.org/importing/importing-body.pdf (last modified May 20, 2002).
I Karchei; 462 U.S. at 734; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that lower courts have required states to justify deviations of less than twenty peo-
ple in congressional redistricting plans).
112 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740.
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cials responsible for creating redistricting plans simply do not account
for the population variations between election districts caused by the
application of the usual residence principle to prisoners, nor are they
113necessarily permitted to do so. As long as redistricting practices are
based on a census that employs the usual residence principle as it now
exists, our congressional districts will continue to defy the one-person,
one-vote command of Article I, Section 2.
V. COLLEGE STUDENTS, MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY,
CHILDREN, AND NONCITIZENS
Because sentence durations vary and because convicted adults in
certain states will regain their legal right to vote once their time is
served, using the usual residence principle to count prisoners presents
one-person, one-vote complications similar to those presented in
counting college students, noncitizens, and members of the military.
The fact that college students and members of the military are
counted at their "usual residence"'4-a college campus and military
base, respectively-is problematic on the one-person, one-vote front if
those individuals choose to vote in their home districts by absentee
113 The Supreme Court has yet to approve of a congressional redistricting plan
based on anything but total population as defined by the decennial census. In Kirkpa-
tfick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1969), the Court rejected Missouri's congressional
redistricting plan, which was based on "haphazard adjustments to a scheme based on
total population." In dicta, the Court stated: "There may be a question whether dis-
tribution of congressional seats except according to total population can ever be per-
missible under Art. I, § 2. But assuming without deciding that apportionment may be
based on eligible voter population rather than total population, the Missouri plan is
still unacceptable." Id. at 534. Several lower courts have held that states must depend
on total population figures from the decennial census for federal congressional redis-
tricting. See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990) (reject-
ing a congressional redistricting plan based on voting age population in favor of a
proposed plan based on total population); Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. 554, 571 (D.
Haw. 1982) (holding "that pursuant to article I, § 2 of the Constitution[.] states must
depend on total federal census figures to apportion congressional districts within their
boundaries"); see also REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, supra note 11, at 17-18 (discussing the
possibility of alternative population bases for redistricting); cf. Meeks v. Avery, 251 F.
Supp. 245, 249-50 (D. Kan. 1966) (rejecting the proposition that Article I, Section 2
requires states to use decennial census figures in redistricting congressional districts).
14 See U.S. Census Bureau, Facts About Census 2000 Residence Rules, at http://
www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/resid_ules.html (last modified Apr. 25,
2003) (defining "usual residence as "the place where the person lives and sleeps most
of the time," and noting that "[t]his place is not necessarily the same as the person's
voting residence or legal residence").
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ballot.'1 This phenomenon is especially troublesome when students
choose to relocate after their four years of college education are com-
plete.
11 6
Similar problems exist whenever an individual moves out of the
district in which she was counted during the decennial census.
Americans, however, have always been a highly mobile people,"7 and
it is improbable that one census every ten years would be able to ac-
count for the daily variances in population. Rather, it is generally ac-
cepted that when some individuals leave an area, others enter. This
reasoning, based on the assumption of replacement, can also be ex-
tended to justify the usage of census figures that include children un-
der the age of eighteen for redistricting purposes. As young adults
enter the voting-age population, deaths result in a commensurate
dwindling of that same population.
Ultimately, there will always be population shifts and that is pre-
cisely why the Founding Fathers called for reapportionment every ten
years. The point here is that groups like college students, members of
the military, children, noncitizens, and those prisoners who stand to
regain their voting power have the potential (however unlikely in the
case of prisoners) to vote in the district in which they are counted.
On the other hand, convicted adults in the states that disenfranchise
prisoners for life will never vote in the district in which they are
counted and have absolutely no potential to do so.
115 States cannot categorically prohibit absentee balloting by students and military
personnel located outside the state at the time of the election. See Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a Texas law barring all active military
personnel from voting in the state); see also Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Note, Dual Resident
Voting: Traditional Disenfranchisement and Prospects for Change, 102 COLuM. L. REV. 1954,
1969 (2002) ("Members of the military and student voters have repeatedly been found
to have a right to vote in the communities in which they temporarily reside while in the
army or attending school ...").
6 Most state laws, however, permit such individuals to change their residency
status and vote in the district where they temporarily reside. See, e.g., Williams v.
Salerno, 792 F.2d 323, 328 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a per se rule prohibiting stu-
dents to register at the location of their dormitory violates equal protection); Whatley
v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1973) (invalidating a Texas statute that pre-
vented college students from registering to vote at their school).
117 See, e.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 550 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "our mobile population rapidly renders [census data] obsolete");
SCHER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4 ("Americans are one of the most mobile populations
in the world.").
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VI. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
The counting of imprisoned adults at their prison address for re-
districting purposes is legally problematic on both statutory and con-
stitutional levels."" The Voting Rights Act of 1965" '9 governs the
treatment of race in the redistricting process. This is important be-
cause a large racial disparity exists in the current prison population.
The following background is key: According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, sixty-three percent of state prison inmates were racial or
ethnic minorities in 2002.12° Based on current rates of first incarcera-
tion, an estimated thirty-two percent of black males will enter state or
federal prison during their lifetime, compared to seventeen percent
of Hispanic males and six percent of white males.
1 2 1
A. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act122 was enacted in response to "a
common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of
the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as
the old ones had been struck down." 12  Section 5 is not universally
applicable; it applies only to nine states and parts of seven others.1
2 4
The "covered jurisdictions" are those with a history of racial discrimi-
nation in electoral practices,125 and for them, Section 5 is "one of the
118 An entirely separate article could be written on the clash between the applica-
tion of the usual residence principle to prisoners and the Voting Rights Act. Thus, the
discussion in this Comment will set out only the basics of the argument.
119 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)).
120 HARRISON & BECK, supra note 109, at 9.
121 THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 8 (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/piusp01 .pdf.
122 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
123 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976).
124 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2003). The covered jurisdictions are the states of Ala-
bama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia, and various counties in California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, and South Dakota. Id.; see also Voting Section, U.S. Dep't ofJus-
tice, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions (listing the states, counties, and townships covered
under Section 5), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/covered.htm (last up-
dated Jan. 28, 2003).
See REDISTRICTING LAw 2000, supra note 11, at 80 (observing that Section 5 fo-
cuses on those states that have had a history of "racially discriminatory electoral prac-
tices").
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most significant legal constraints on the redistricting process."' 26 Sec-
tion 5 requires covered jurisdictions to submit their redistricting plans
to either the Attorney General or the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for administrative or judicial preclearance.
127
Before granting preclearance, the Attorney General or the District
Court must determine that the new redistricting plan "does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color, or [membership in a lan-
guage minority group] .,, 128 The effects prong of Section 5 is impli-
cated by the Bureau of Census' usual residence principle.
A redistricting plan that will lead to retrogression, or a worsening
of position, in the power of voters belonging to a racial or language
minority group runs afoul of Section 5's effects prong.29 Minority vot-
ing strength can be reduced in two very different ways: (1) by splitting
up or "fragmenting" concentrations of minority voters into two or
more districts so as to dilute their voting power as a cohesive bloc;130 or
(2) by "packing" minority voters into one district, reducing their abil-
ity to act as influential voting blocs in several separate districts.13
When Census officials count incarcerated adults-a majority of whom
are members of a racial or ethnic minority group-at their prison ad-
dress, and the resulting figures are used by states in creating redistrict-
ing plans, it can be argued that those states are in effect fragmenting
or packing minority concentrations. Counting minority prisoners
outside of their communities lessens or fragments minority voting
power in the communities from which those prisoners originate. De-
pending, of course, on the size of the proposed congressional district
and the size of the minority prison population, one can also argue
that, by including the prison population in a redistricting plan, states
126 HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 14.
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (stating that preclearance must be granted for any change
in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting"); Beer, 425 U.S. at 133
(deeming new congressional or legislative redistricting plans to be such a change).
For a succinct explanation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see HEBERT
ETAL., supra note 11, at 14-21.
128 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (emphasis added).
129 See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 16 ("A change in a State's districting plan is
considered to have an impermissibly discriminatory effect under Section 5's 'effects
prong' if it will lead to a 'retrogression' in the position of members of a racial or lan-
guage minority group."); see also Beer, 425 U.S. at 639 ("In other words, the purpose of
§ 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that
would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities ... .
130 See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 17.
131 Id.
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are packing congressional districts with minorities, leading to the ap-
pearance of an influential voting bloc where none actually exists. Pro-
vided that minority prisoners exist in adequate numbers, the usual
residence principle runs directly into the effects prong of Section 5.
The above analysis reaches an obstacle when one considers that
retrogression is assessed by comparing the proposed plan to a
"benchmark."'3 2 The benchmark will generally be the districting plan
in effect at the time the new plan is proposed.'133 Because the redis-
tricting plan in effect will most likely have been based on census fig-
ures generated using the usual residence principle, the proposed plan
will not differ much from the benchmark.134 The Attorney General or
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia would
have to employ a different benchmark-perhaps one that counted
prisoners at their last known address or one that did not count per-
manently disenfranchised prisoners at all-in order for the effects
prong of Section 5 to be implicated. That, however, is not what the
law requires, so we must turn to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for
a more practical analysis.
B. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act135 applies universally and is
aimed at effectuating the Fifteenth Amendment. 36 Section 2 prohib-
its minority vote dilution-"the minimization or canceling out of mi-
nority voting strength."'
37 In two major cases in 1986 and 1994,139
132 Id. at 16.
133 Id.
134 But see id. at 16 ("If the current plan is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander
or is not legally enforceable under Section 5, the last constitutional, legally enforceable
plan used by the State will be designated as the benchmark." (internal citations omit-
ted)).
135 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
136 HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 22; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
43 (1986) (holding that Section 2 "prohibits all states and political subdivisions from
imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any standards, prac-
tices or procedures" that have a discriminatory intent or effect (first emphasis added)).
For a concise but comprehensive discussion of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
the development of the Court's jurisprudence, see HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 22-
49.
137 HEBERT ETAL., supra note 11, at 22; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (holding that
Section 2 covers claims of minority vote dilution, which exists when the electoral prac-
tice or procedure "operate[s] to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
[minorities in] the voting population" (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88
(1966))); Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE
454 . UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
the Court developed and expounded upon a three-prong test for de-
termining when a state must create a majority-minority district.14 In
evaluating a redistricting plan under Section 2, courts and states must
ask the following questions: (1) Does the racial or language minority
group have sufficient numerosity and geographical compactness to
constitute a majority in a single-member district drawn differently?;
(2) Is the group politically cohesive?; and (3) Does the white majority
vote as a bloc, enabling it to defeat the minority group's preferred
candidate?14 1 Courts and states must also consider whether there is
rough proportionality between the number of majority-minority dis-
tricts and the minority's share of the state's relevant population.42
Many factors play into whether a minority group can show that the
answer to each of the above questions is "yes." For example, courts
disagree as to when a minority group is "sufficiently large" enough to
constitute a "majority.'' 43 Some courts also use voting-age population
DILUTION 1, 4 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (stating that "[m]inority vote dilution"
occurs when "the voting strength of an ethnic or racial minority group is diminished or
cancelled out by the block vote of the majority" group).
138 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-73 (establishing a three-pronged test for Section 2 claims
based on geographic compactness, political cohesiveness among the minority group,
and racial bloc voting among the majority group).
139 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (adding a proportionality require-
ment to the three-prong test adopted in Thornburgv. Gingles).
140 Although not accepted as the universal definition, a majority-minority district is
generally considered to be one in which a minority group constitutes an effective vot-
ing majority. SeeJohnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (defin-
ing a majority-minority district as one where the majority of the district's population
are members of a single racial minority), affd, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 861
F. Supp. 408, 417 n.3 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that a majority-minority district is one
where "a majority of the registered voters and the voting age population are members
of the same racial minority"), rev'd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); HEBERT ET
AL., supra note 11, at 22-24 (discussing Gingles's definition of a "majority-minority" dis-
trict). While outside the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that in 1993
the Court limited the role that race is permitted to play in redistricting. Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
141 HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 23.
142 Id. at 24-25; see also De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1000 (holding that while "propor-
tionality is not dispositive in a challenge to single-member districting," it is nevertheless
"a relevant fact.., to be analyzed when determining whether members of a minority
group have 'less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."' (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1973)).
143 Some courts have used a simple majority threshold (i.e., greater than fifty per-
cent of the population) to determine whether a minority population is "sufficiently
large" to create a majority-minority district, while others have used the concept of an
"effective voting majority" (i.e., enough minority voters to elect candidates of their
choice). Compare Stabler v. Thurston County, 129 F.3d 1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 1997)
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as a measure of the relevant population in lieu of total population fig-
ures in analyzing Section 2 claims. 4 4 There is also a debate regarding
how courts are to determine minority political cohesiveness and the
degree of racial polarization. 145 If a minority community can satisfy
Section 2's three-prong analysis, then an argument similar to the one
made for Section 5 can be advanced.' 4 The process of counting pris-
oners-who have potential to vote 147-as part of the population of the
congressional district where they are held may fragment or pack an
effective minority voting majority.
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the constitu-
tional implications of applying the usual residence principle to disen-
franchised prisoners, and lower courts are in disagreement as to the
(upholding district court's use of total population), and Houston v. Lafayette County,
20 F. Supp. 2d 996, 997-99 (N.D. Miss. 1998) (using total population as the basis for
evaluating a Section 2 claim), with Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 702 (7th
Cir. 1998) (holding that "in order to constitute an effective majority," minorities "must
be at least 65 percent of the total population of a district in order to be able to elect" a
candidate of their choice), and Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp.
2d 618, 642 (D.S.C. 2002) ("We measure equal opportunity by the percentage of mi-
nority age voting population necessary for the minority voters to elect the candidate of
their choice .... ).
144 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that:
The threshold requirement roughly measures minority voters' potential to
elect candidates of their choice. Because only minorities of voting age can af-
fect this potential, it is logical to assume that the Court intended the majority
requirement to mean a voting age majority. Viewed another way, those ineli-
gible to vote have not experienced a dilution of their vote. They are not par-
ties to a section 2 claim.
McNeilv. Springfield Park District, 851 F.2d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Clark v. Put-
nam County, 293 F.3d 1261, 1263 n.2 (1Ith Cir. 2002) ("In a majority-minority district,
a majority of the voting age population is from the minority population." (emphasis
added)); NAACP v. Fordice, 252 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2001) (evaluating minority
plaintiffs' Section 2 claims based on "African-American majority voting age population
districts").
145 In Gingles, the Supreme Court approved the use of ecological correlation and
regression analysis to determine racial polarization. 478 U.S. at 52-53. For other fac-
tors that courts have considered in determining political cohesiveness and racial po-
larization, see HEBERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 33-43.
146 See supra Part VI.A (discussing potential Section 5 arguments against the usual
residence principle as applied to prisoners).
147 As discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 163-164, it is relevant not
only that these prisoners have no potential to vote, but that their interests will not be
adequately represented by the majority of people that do.
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issues that would guide its analysis. I suggest two possible solutions to
this constitutional conundrum.
A. Count Prisoners at Their Last Residence of Record
Doing away with the usual residence requirement, at least as ap-
plied to prisoners and disenfranchised former prisoners, is the least
legally problematic solution to this constitutional puzzle. An act of
Congress would be required to override the administrative policy of
the Census Bureau. 14  Such an act would direct census officials to
count prisoners as residing at their last address of record. 49 In lieu of
an act of Congress, the Court would have to step in and declare the
usual residence rule unconstitutional as applied. The Third Circuit
has addressed a challenge to Census Bureau practices. In Bethel Park
v. Stans,15 the plaintiffs challenged the usual residence requirement as
applied to college students, members of the military, and prison in-
mates.' 5' Their concern was not only its effect on the composition of
congressional districts within their state, but on the apportionment of
congressional seats between the states.1 2 The Third Circuit held that
Congress had delegated responsibility for conducting the decennial
census to the Census Bureau through the Secretary of Commerce and
concluded that the usual residence principle was "a historically rea-
sonable means of interpreting the Constitutional and legislative
phrase 'whole number of persons in each State.' ' ,,3 The court curso-
rily addressed the Bureau's policy as applied to "inmates of institu-
tions," reasoning that such institutionalized individuals "often have no
other fixed place of abode, and the length of their institutional stay is
often indefinite."1 54 The court offered no evidence to support its
148 Cf Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S.
316, 326 (1999) (noting that Congress attempted to pass legislation overriding the
Census Bureau's decision to use sampling in the 2000 Census, but ultimately failed to
do so).
149 Cf Oversight of the 2000 Census: Hearing on HR. 1632 Before the Subcomm. on the
Census, House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 4 (discussing proposed legislation
that would "attribute the counts of prisoners to their 'home state' or the State in which
they were convicted").
150 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971).
151 Id. at 577.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 578; see also District of Columbia v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 789
F. Supp. 1179, 1188-89 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that the Census Bureau's decision to
count inmates at a Virginia prison operated by the District of Columbia as Virginia
residents was not arbitrary or capricious).
154 449 F.2d at 582.
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assertion that prisoners have no fixed address. ' If this is in fact true,
the solution proposed below would be more appropriate.
B. Do Not Count Prisoners for Redistricting Purposes
Although much more controversial than the previous option,
Congress could pass a law that prohibits states from including disen-
franchised prisoners in their population base for redistricting. This
proposition is controversial for two reasons. First, the Court has rec-
ognized that there may be serious Article I, Section 2 concerns with
using a population base other than total population for redistricting156
purposes. Second, there are serious policy concerns with a law that
may be considered to treat prisoners as non-entities.
In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,'57 the Supreme Court recognized that
"[t] here may be a question whether distribution of congressional seats
except according to total population can ever be permissible under
Article I, Section 2. " 58 In Burns v. Richardson,"59 however, the Court
stated:
Neither in Reynolds v. Sims nor in any other decision has this Court sug-
gested that the States are required to include aliens, transients, short-
term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction
of crime, in the apportionment base by which their legislators are dis-
tributed and against which compliance with the Equal Protection Clause
is to be measured. °
The Burns and Reynolds Courts were addressing the redistricting of
state legislative districts, however, not congressional districts. Because
the Court has interpreted Article I, Section 2 as it applies to congres-
sional districts more strictly than the Equal Protection Clause's appli-
cation to state legislative districts,"1 it is unclear whether the Court
15 Even if this assertion can be proven, it can still be argued that prisoners should
be counted for redistricting purposes at their last address of record, even if they reside
in one of the thirteen states that permanently disenfranchises incarcerated adults. The
argument would rest on the proposition that a prisoner's interests are better repre-
sented in the district from which they originate or that their interests would be ignored
in the district in which they are imprisoned.
156 See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) ("If a state does attempt
to use a measure other than total population [for redistricting] ... it may not do so in
a haphazard, inconsistent, or conjectural manner."); see also supra note 113.
57 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
158 Id. at 534-35.
159 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
160 Id. at 92.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 61-92 (comparing the one-person, one-vote
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would extend the Burns rationale to the redistricting of federal elec-
tion districts.
Lower courts have taken different sides in this debate. Several
courts have held that states must depend on total population figures
from the decennial census for federal congressional redistricting. 1
2
Those courts have reasoned that the Supreme Court's one-person,
one-vote jurisprudence is more closely based on the principle of
"'[e]qual representation for equal numbers of people.' 1 63 A repre-
sentative is charged with representing everyone in her district,
whether or not that person is a voter. Assuming that a representative
would pay equal consideration to the interests of the prisoners in her
district, whether or not such prisoners were included in the district's
population base, removing prisoners from that base would result in
unequal access to federal representatives across districts. In other
words, if a Member of Congress must represent the interests of all in-
dividuals in her geographical congressional district even though some
of those individuals were not counted for interstate reapportionment
purposes, that representative may, in essence, be responsible for more
people than a neighboring representative. Some courts have viewed
this possibility as even more constitutionally problematic than the
status quo.164
On the other hand, at least one court has rejected the proposition
that Article I, Section 2 requires states to use decennial census figures
in redistricting congressional districts. 165 In Meeks v. Avery, the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas determined that the use
of state-conducted census figures was a proper "exercise of judgment
in the legislative process."1 6 6 These figures were based on "established
residence" and excluded college students, inmates of penal institu-
tions, and individuals living on military bases.' 67 The court reasoned
principle in the context of state legislative and congressional redistricting).
See supra note 113 (describing cases where courts instructed states to utilize to-
tal population figures).
163Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 775 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531).
164 See supra text accompanying notes 76-83 (describing the Court's decisions
mandating strict population equality among congressional districts).1653
Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 245, 249-50 (D. Kan. 1966); see also City of Detroit
v. Sec'y of Commerce, 4 F.3d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[i]f figures other
than census count are the best population data available, the Supreme Court [has]
not ... bar[red] their use" in redistricting).
166 Meeks, 251 F. Supp. at 250.
167 Id. at 249.
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that "[rleferences in Article I, Sections 2 and 4; in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; and in 2 U.S.C.A. § 2a, to
the enumeration of the population of the various states have to do
with the apportionment of representatives among the states, not within
them. ,, lc8
CONCLUSION
In this Comment, I have examined the propriety of counting im-
prisoned persons at their prison address for redistricting purposes. I
have suggested that this practice runs afoul of both constitutional and
statutory requirements. The Census Bureau's "usual residence" prin-
ciple, as applied to disenfranchised prisoners and former prisoners,
cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote ju-
risprudence. The Court has refused to protect prisoners stripped of
the most fundamental right accorded citizens of a democracy-the
right to vote. It is time for either Congress or the Court to protect
law-abiding citizens from state legislatures that unfairly take advantage
of the existence of a disenfranchised population when creating
"equal" congressional voting districts. "We the People" demand noth-
ing less.
16s Id. at 249-50.
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APPENDIX: FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
(As OF NOVEMBER 1, 2003)
STATE PRISON PAROLE PROBATION EX-FELON SOURCE
Alabama Yes Yes Yes Yes ALA. CONST.
amend. 579
(Michie Supp. 2002)
Alaska Yes Yes Yes No ALASKA STAT.
§ 15.05.030
(Michie 2002)
Arizona Yes Yes Yes Yes' ARIz. REV. STAT.
§§ 13-904 to 13-906
(2001)
Arkansas Yes Yes Yes No ARK. CONST.
amend. 51, § 11 (4)
California Yes Yes No No CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 2101 (West 2003)
Colorado Yes Yes No No COLO. CONST.
art. 7, § 10.
Connecticut Yes Yes No No CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 9-46a (2002)
Delaware Yes Yes Yes Yes DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 15, § 1701
(Michie Supp. 2002)
District of Yes No No No D.C. CODE ANN.
Columbia § 1-1-1.02(7) (2001)
Florida Yes Yes Yes Yes FLA. STAT. §
97.041(2) (b) (2002)
Georgia Yes Yes Yes No GA. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2-216(b) (2003)
Hawaii Yes No No No HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 831-2(a)
(Supp. 2001)
Idaho Yes No No No IDAHO CODE § 18-310
(Michie 2003)
Illinois Yes No No No 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/5-5-5 (West 2003)
Indiana Yes No No No IND. CODE ANN.
§ 3-7-13-5
(West 2003)
Iowa Yes Yes Yes Yes IOWA CODE
§ 48A.6(1) (2002)
Kansas Yes Yes Yes No KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 214615 (2002)
Kentucky Yes Yes Yes Yes KY. CONST. § 145
(2002)
Iouisiana Yes No No No LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:102 (West 2003)
Maine No No No No Not applicable
Maryland Yes Yes Yes Yes MD. ANN. CODE art.
EL, § 3-102 (2003)
Massachusetts Yes No No No MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 51, § 1
(Law. Co-op. 2003)
Michigan Yes No No No MICH. COMP. IAWS
ANN. § 168.758b
(West 2002)
Minnesota Yes Yes Yes No MINN. STAT.I I_ i _ § 201.014 (2002)
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STATE PRISON PAROLE PROBATION Ex-FELON SOURCE
Mississippi Yes Yes Yes Yes MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 23-15-11 (2003)
Missouri Yes Yes Yes No Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 115.133 (2003)
Montana Yes No No No MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1-111 (2002)
Nebraska Yes Yes Yes No NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 32-313 (2003)
Nevada Yes Yes Yes Yes NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 293-540 (2003)
New Hampshire Yes No No No N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 607-A:2 (2002)
NewJersey Yes Yes Yes No NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:4-1 (West 2002)
New Mexico Yes Yes Yes No N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-4-27.1
(Michie 2003)
New York Yes No Yes No N.Y. ELEC. LAW
§ 5-106
(McKinney 2003)
North Carolina Yes Yes Yes No N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-55 (2003)
North Dakota Yes No No No N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-33-01 (2003)
Ohio Yes No No No OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2961.01
(West 2003)
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes No OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 4-101
(West 2002)
Oregon Yes No No No OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 137.275, 137.281
(2001)
Pennsylvania Yes No No No 25 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1301
(West 2003)
Rhode Island Yes Yes Yes No R.I. CONST.,
art. 2, § 1
South Carolina Yes Yes Yes No S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 7-5-120
(Law Co-op. 2002)
South Dakota Yes No No No S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 12-4-18
(Michie 2003)
Tennessee Yes Yes Yes Yes TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-20-112 (2003)
Texas Yes Yes Yes No TEX. ELEC. CODE
ANN. § 13.001 (a) (4)
(Vernon 2002)
Utah Yes No No No UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20A-2-101 (2003)
Vermont No No No No Not applicable.
Virginia Yes Yes Yes Yes VA. CODE ANN.
§ 24.2-101
(Michie 2003)
Washington Yes Yes Yes Yes WASH. CONsT. art. 6,
§ 3; WASH. REV.
CODE § 29.01.080
(2003)
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STATE PRISON PAROLE PROBATION EX-FELON SOURCE
West Virginia Yes Yes Yes No W. VA. CODE
§§ 3-1-3, -3-2-2 (2003)
Wisconsin Yes Yes Yes Yes WIS. STAT.
§ 6.03(1)(b) (2002)
Wyoming Yes Yes Yes No MO. STAT.
§ 22-.-102(a) (i)
(Michie 2003)
Permanently after second felony conviction.
2 For five years after end of incarceration for some felony offenses.
3 For three years after end of felony incarceration; permanently upon second conviction for a
violent felony.
4 Except for first-time nonviolent felonies.
